








The University of Adelaide 
School of Economics 
 
 












 March 2009 
 
 
The University of Adelaide, School of Economics 




THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM* 
 
 
Richard Pomfret  
 
 
School of Economics  
The University of Adelaide,  








Financial sector innovation and development has been an integral part of the rise of 
capitalism over the last half millennium.  The innovations of the last three decades of 
the twentieth century were a continuation of the trend; they contributed to an era of 
global prosperity, but also increased the probability of bank failures as bankers and 
policymakers inexperienced in the new instruments made mistaken decisions.  The 
likelihood of crises was increased by public policies which increased moral hazard.  
Governments regulate the financial sector due to asymmetric information between 
depositors and deposit-taking institutions; restricting entry or the lending activity of 
financial institutions is inefficient, so the weight is now placed on deposit insurance 
with moral hazard consequences.  The policy challenge is to reduce moral hazard 
without repressing the financial sector and creating adverse selection in lending 
practices.  Since the mid-1980s cheap money policies have exacerbated moral hazard 
associated with inadequate financial sector regulation by encouraging highly 
leveraged investments.  The post-2007 financial crisis was one of many crises with 
idiosyncratic catalysts but with common underlying causes: cheap money available to 
participants in the integrated but imperfectly regulated global financial market 
eventually led to loan defaults and bank failures.  This is not the end of capitalism, but 
a reminder of the difficult balancing acts involved in policing the financial sector 
which is at the heart of capitalist economies. 
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The Financial Sector and the Future of Capitalism 
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-8 evinced a chorus of lessons from history, mostly 
drawn from 1929 and with advice that governments needed to act decisively.  The 
Depression of the 1930s is a poor source because almost any lessons can be drawn 
and because the economy of eighty years ago was vastly different from today’s 
economy.  So many mistakes were made after 1929 in the USA and Europe in 
monetary policy, fiscal policy, banking policy, trade policy . . . the list seems endless, 
and with so many policy errors it is difficult to know which were critical and what 
policy changes would have been sufficient to reduce the severity of the depression.  
Moreover, today’s economy is both more complex, in large part because of financial 
innovations, and has more institutional diversity than that of 1929, when central banks 
were instinctively opposed to interventionist measures and international institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund not yet existed.
1 
More relevant lessons from history can be taken from the three decades before 
2007-8 when financial market liberalization was accompanied by economic prosperity 
punctuated by frequent crises.
2   Financial liberalization was part of the reform 
package that underlay the 1986-93 prosperity of Mexico and the 1982-96 boom in 
Thailand (during this period the fastest growing economy in the world).  Despite signs 
that capital inflows were decelerating, neither government was willing to take action 
before their economies suffered a hard landing in the 1994 Tequila Crisis and the 
1997 Asian Crisis.  These, as well as the many other crises of the 1990s, were 
considered country-specific (e.g. due to the dollar-indexed nature of Mexican debt, 
unregulated financial institutions in Thailand or the special form of Russian 
government liabilities in 1998) rather than a concomitant of liberalization.  In the 
high-income countries, the Japanese experience and Scandinavian banking crises were 
dismissed as special cases, perhaps exacerbated by macroeconomic mismanagement,
3 
                                                 
1 Ahamed (2009) provides an entertaining account of the role of central bankers in the 1920s and 
1930s. 
2 Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) identify 38 financial crises between 1945 and 1973 and 139 between 
1973 and 1997.  Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) identified 112 banking crises in 93 countries (and 51 
borderline crises in 46 countries) between the late 1970s and 1997, with an average fiscal cost of about 
12% of GDP.  Laeven and Valencia (2008), excluding ‘crises’ affecting isolated banks, identify 124 
systemic banking crises from 1970 to 2007 and examine 42 of these in detail. 
3 Following financial market deregulation, Finland, Norway and Sweden all experienced equity market 
and housing bubbles in the 1980s, which were accompanied by procyclical macro policies.  Norway’s 
1988 crisis followed the decline energy prices and depressions in Finland in 1990 and Sweden in 1991 
were associated with economic collapse in eastern Europe.   3
while in the USA the S&L Crisis was dismissed as a special case of poor management 
and greed and neither the 1987 stock market crash nor the dot-com bubble bursting in 
2000 caused sufficient concern to worry about systemic instability.    
In this paper I argue that increased vulnerability to financial crises is a 
consequence of financial development that has been exacerbated by easy monetary 
policy.  Although nobody welcomes crises, it is important to place them in a longer 
term context of financial reform generally delivering greater prosperity.
4  Financial 
innovation has accentuated these benefits, whether in Renaissance Florence, 
eighteenth century England or in many countries in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century.  Today’s short-attention-span media coverage focuses on dramatic events 
(the crises) and not on the longer term context, such as Mexico’s economic 
development over the two decades after 1986.
5  Japan has not lost the fruits of its 
post-1945 rapid economic growth; despite the magnitude of the asset bubble that burst 
in the late 1980s and the ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s, Japan remains the world’s 
second-largest economy. 
Financially more developed economies grow faster, but are exposed to sources 
of instability unknown in less developed economies.  The policy dilemma - how to 
balance the demands of long-term growth and short-term stability – is a typical 
financial trade-off between return and risk.  The business cycles of the last two 
centuries and Keynesian macroeconomics are consequences of financial 
intermediation that opens up the possibility of a mismatch between desired saving and 
desired investment.
6  Governments since 1945 have responded to the challenge with 
                                                 
4 I ignore egregious exceptions like Albania in 1996-7 where gullible depositors were taken in by 
pyramid schemes whose deposits, held by two-thirds of the population, reached almost half of GDP 
before the institutions collapsed, and the huge loss of people’s savings contributed to civil disorder in 
which several thousand people were killed.  An economically literate population is a prerequisite for an 
efficient financial sector.  The formerly centrally planned economies were an exceptional case of 
countries with good education levels but low degree of understanding of market economies. 
5 The real effects of the Tequila Crisis lasted no more than a couple of years, as economic growth 
resumed in 1996 and had reached 7% per annum in 1999.  Economic growth also resumed in Brazil, 
the main sufferer from contagion from the Tequila Crisis, and was sufficiently firmly based that Brazil 
would be viewed as one of the leading emerging economies in the 2000s.  Rancière, Tornell and 
Westermann (2008) provide more systematic evidence of a positive relationship between crisis-prone 
economies and growth, although their time series does not include the post-2007 data points. 
6 The nineteenth century French economist, Clément Juglar, whose best-known aphorism is “The only 
cause of depression is prosperity”, expounded a similar view.  For Juglar depressions were only truly 
possible in a system with credit creation (and hence were a nineteenth century novelty), and it was the 
abuse of credit rather than the issue of money that led to crises; credit encourages speculation, and 
overoptimism and herding lead to this getting out of hand.  In his emphasis on “animal spirits” Juglar 
predates Keynes, but whereas Keynes focussed on the depression Juglar focused on prosperity with 
depression as an unavoidable concomitant.  Schumpeter championed this view, where the depression   4
discretionary macroeconomic policy and by financial regulation.  As macropolicy was 
succeeded in dampening business cycles and fears of unemployment approaching 
1930s levels had receded, governments became more willing to loosen financial 
regulations or permit innovations which undermined the scope of regulations.
7 
In a market-based economy in which prices largely capture social costs and 
benefits, any impediment to financial intermediaries directing funds to those 
borrowers willing to pay the most will have economic costs, and because these costs 
are largely in the form of a suboptimal capital stock they will result in reduced long-
term growth.  Nevertheless, governments intervene everywhere in the financial sector.  
First, governments protect small depositors with asymmetric information about banks.  
Second, governments may think that the state can allocate capital better than private 
institutions, although this motive became widely discredited in the final decades of 
the twentieth century. Third, during financial crises governments intervene to prevent 
systemic failure.  The first and last motives are interconnected.  An expanded and 
more complex financial sector is more likely to contain institutions which will go 
bankrupt, but the degree of risk-taking and risk of failure are endogenous to a deposit-
insured system unless the government can devise policies to offset the moral hazard 
impact of deposit insurance.  Inevitably, this balance is hard to attain, and financial 
crises are a concomitant of financial reform; crises are something to be minimized but 
not eliminated, because financial liberalization is desirable in order to enable financial 
intermediation to work as well as possible.
8 
In practice it is difficult to separate out the fundamental relations between 
financial reform and financial crises from other recent events.  The post-2007 crisis 
was preceded by global macroeconomic imbalances, and previous events from the 
great inflation of the 1970s to the 2000 dot-com bubble shaped people’s decisions.  
Nevertheless, the common features of so many post-1970s crises suggest that short-
term catalysts need to be distinguished from deeper determinants of the risk-taking 
                                                                                                                                            
contributes to creative destruction by weeding out inefficient firms, in his History of Economic 
Analysis.  See, Dal-Pont Legrand and Hagemann (2005). 
7 Innovations which bypassed regulations can be traced back to the expansion of Eurodollar markets in 
the 1960s.  Despite the stagflation of the 1970s macropolicy remained successful in dampening 
business cycles, an effect dubbed the Great Moderation (Fogli and Perri, 2006; Galí and Gambetti, 
2009). 
8 The balance is about containing rather than eliminating moral hazard, which is inherent in limited 
liability. The invention of limited liability and emergence of banks with dispersed shareholders was 
overall beneficial because, despite the limit to downside but not to upside risk, shareholders generally 
tolerate reasonable but not excessive risk-taking.   5
that led to recurring crises.  The post-2007 crisis is often characterized as a US-
originating sub-prime crisis, but it was also driven by poor loans for construction 
projects in countries other than the USA and by poor risk management unrelated to 
real estate loans.  The crisis in the USA was the most important because of the size of 
the US economy, but this was not a crisis whose roots were only in the USA and it 
was not just about poorly judged mortgage lending.  It was one of a sequence of crises 
across the globe since the 1970s, and this paper seeks to identify common roots.
9 
The first section briefly reviews the evidence for a positive relationship 
between financial development and long-run economic growth, emphasising that 
more regulated financial sectors are prone to adverse selection in their lending 
decisions and that less regulated financial intermediaries are more likely to make 
lending decisions and to promote financial innovations conducive to increased 
economic well-being.  The second section analyses the need for financial regulations 
to prevent the system from becoming too unstable, the political imperative of 
protecting individual depositors, and the moral hazard implications of such policies.  
In a period of rapid innovation, financial regulators inevitably find difficulty in 
striking an appropriate regulatory balance, and in the final decades of the twentieth 
century this played out against a background of easy credit, which exacerbated the 
moral hazard problem by making leveraging and risk-taking less costly.  Section 3 
analyses the credit-driven boom, and Section 4 deals with the global crisis which 
began to emerge in 2007.  The final section draws conclusions in the context of 
discussing whether financial crises signal that capitalism is failing 
 
1. The Financial Sector and Economic Growth 
 
A financial sector which intermediates between savers and investors as well as 
providing financial services to traders and others is a crucial part of any capitalist 
economy.  This is a staple of most economic historians’ thinking, although it has been 
difficult to place finance in formal models of economic growth or development, and 
the cross-country evidence of finance and growth is inconclusive.
10  One difficulty 
                                                 
9 The 1970s is an appropriate starting point because it was the decade when financial markets became 
global, the role of government was reassessed (especially in the UK and USA), and the intellectual 
foundations for financial innovations based on derivatives were laid by Black, Scholes  and Merton. 
10 Lucas (1988, p.6), in a seminal contribution to the new economic growth literature, claimed that “the 
importance of financial matters is very badly over-stressed in popular and even much professional   6
with making generalizations about finance and development across all countries is the 
presence of threshold effects; restricting the sample to high and upper-middle income 
countries changes the picture, and economic historians have consistently assigned an 
important role to financial development in today’s high-income countries, whether in 
case studies or cross-section analysis.
11  Berkowitz and DeJong (2009) provide cross-
sectional evidence for Russia’s republics of a positive relationship between bank 
credit per head and economic growth 2000-7. 
The development literature presents strong negative evidence that finance 
matters.  Countries which repressed their financial sectors during the1950s and 1960s 
import-substitution era suffered negative consequences for long-term economic 
growth.  When interest rates were kept below the market-clearing level, there was 
little loss of savings because the interest elasticity of supply of saving is low, but the 
excess demand for loans at low interest rates was associated with misallocation of 
capital (Fry, 1988).  The explanation of adverse selection in low income countries 
might be in terms of preferential treatment of the president’s relatives, the low quality 
of loan officers or the conservatism of state-owned banks which preferred low-risk 
loans regardless of their economic return, but the lessons are broader.  When savings 
are not allocated by the price mechanism, then capital is likely to be misallocated.
12 
International financial markets had opened up in the 1960s and expanded 
rapidly in the 1970s when banks recycled oil exporters’ surpluses to developing 
country borrowers.  Due to inexperience on both sides, that episode led to over-
lending (or to too risky lending) culminating in the 1982 Debt Crisis.  There followed 
a hiatus in north-south financial flows, but they resumed in the 1990s as corporations 
and governments in many low and middle-income countries became active 
                                                                                                                                            
discussion” (of economic development).  Levine (1997) surveys, the generally positive, empirical 
evidence on financial development and economic growth in a literature which draws heavily on IMF 
and Summers-Heston post-1960 data.  Favara (2003) provides a more critical review of the evidence, 
attacking the econometric techniques of Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000).   
11 Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) use historical data from five countries (the USA, UK, Canada, Norway 
and Sweden) over a long period (1870-1929) in a dynamic setting and find that financial intermediation 
Granger-caused real output performance with little feedback from real growth to the financial sector. 
12 The inefficient allocation of capital was indicated by increasing incremental capital-output ratios 
(ICORs) in countries like India or the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s.  An ICOR of 3-4 is normal 
in well-functioning market economies.  India’s ICOR increased from 4-4.5 in the first half of the 1960s 
to a peak of 10.5 in 1975 (reported in the Asian Development Bank’s Asian Economic Outlook 1990, p. 
138), i.e. an additional unit of capital made less than half the contribution to output in 1976 than it had 
made a dozen years earlier.  In the Soviet Union the ICOR increased from 3.7 in the period 1950-60, to 
5.0 in 1960-75 and 14.8 in 1975-85 (Gregory, 1994, 129); that the USSR required five units of capital to 
generate an additional unit of output in the 1960-75 period should have been a warning sign, while the 
ICOR of about 15 in 1975-85 reflected enormous inefficiency in the use of new capital.  .   7
participants in the international financial system.  These international financial flows 
brought mutual benefits, although they were also a source of instability.  For many 
open economies, banking crises were associated with balance of payments crises and 
exchange rate depreciation, but this aspect is not the focus of the present paper. 
In the 1970s and 1980s many countries reduced the level of state ownership in 
banking and deregulated their financial sectors, as both private ownership and 
increased competition were acknowledged to increase efficiency. In the USA, 
financial innovations initially centred on new methods of spreading risk as, following 
the generalized floating of the major currencies, a currency futures market was 
launched in Chicago in 1972.  The US banking sector was gradually liberalized, and 
especially in the 1980s the government became disengaged, allowing financial 
institutions to bypass existing legislation years before it was formally repealed.
13  Big 
Bangs in the financial markets of New York in 1975 and London in 1986 led to lower 
transactions costs and heralded further financial developments. The removal of 
Western European countries’ exchange controls (led by the UK in 1979) gave a boost 
to cross-border investing, which in turn put pressure on anti-competitive practices 
such as stockbrokers’ fixed commissions.  As stockbrokers lost fee income and 
commercial banks sought to break out of their limited business activities, financial 
conglomerates emerged.  In the EU, Australia and elsewhere, financial markets were 
opened to international competition.  Restrictive laws were abolished.
14 
The innovations improved the financial sector’s ability to intermediate savings 
and investment, and allowed informed market participants to select their exposure to 
risk.  Increased financial sector sophistication helped firms to perform well during 
what was generally a boom era in the 1990s and early 2000s.  Many start-up 
entrepreneurs made fortunes, as venture capitalists were willing to take on the risk of 
lending to unproven small businesses.  Consumers went on a buying binge, driving up 
                                                 
13 Regulation Q limiting the interest rate on bank deposits to 3% had worked in banks’ favour in the 
1950s and 1960s because they obtained deposits cheaply.  As interest rates rose in the early 1980s, 
banks competing for deposits sought loopholes, which were formalized by legislation such as the 1982 
Garn-St. Germain Act authorising money market deposit accounts.  Regulation Q was phased out in 
1986.  The 1927 McFadden Act prohibiting interstate banking was circumvented by developments such 
as the establishment of bank holding companies, and was repealed in 1994. The Glass-Steagall Act 
separating commercial and investment banking was repealed in 1999. 
14  In the UK, for example, after the 1986 Deregulation of the Building Societies Act the largest 
mortgage lenders demutualized, permitting these formerly specialized mortgage institutions to become 
for all intents and purposes diversified banks.   8
house prices as they obtained cheap mortgage loans, and using credit card debt or 
second mortgages to finance further discretionary expenditures.
15   
In the fifteen years before the 2007 financial crisis the OECD countries with 
the most deregulated financial sectors and biggest asset bubbles had substantially 
faster income growth than those with more regulated financial sectors (Table 1).   
Among the largest countries, nominal GDP in the USA and UK increased by 120% 
and 150% respectively, while corresponding figures for Germany and France were 
60% and 87%.  Spain’s nominal GDP increased by 133% while Italy’s increased only 
by 67%.  Among smaller EU members, the 370% increase in Ireland, with its 
deregulated financial sector, far outpaced any of the others (e.g. 180% in Greece).  
Such pairwise comparisons suggest that, even though the countries in the left panel of 
Table 1 will suffer more severe crises after 2007, they have a big cushion of added 
prosperity from the financial deregulation era. 
 
Table 1: GDP in Current US Dollars (billions), 1992-2007 
 
  1992 2007  %  change   1992 2007  %  change
USA 6,286.8  13,811.2 119.7 Germany 2,062.1  3,297.2  59.9
UK 1,074.0  2,727.8  154.0 France 1,372.8  2,562.3 86.6
Spain 612.6  1,429.2  133.3 Italy 1,265.8  2,107.5  66.5
Ireland 54.3  255.0  369.6 Greece 128.4  360.0  180.4
Australia 320.6  821.7  156.3     




19,764.1 38,219.0  93.4 World 24,533.6  54,347.0 121.5
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators – accessed on 27 January 2009 at  
http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers 
 
There were positive spillover effects from the growth and diversification of 
the real economy in the financial-sector-reforming high-income countries, and these 
were most likely strongest in third countries with domestic vibrant financial sectors.  
Around the world billions of people enjoy their mobile phones, and other consumer 
goods which would have been less abundant and varied in a less integrated global 
                                                 
15  The gains were not shared equally; income inequality increased in most high-income countries.   
Among the biggest beneficiaries were the companies in the financial sector and their employees who 
received ever larger bonuses.  More generally, 1981-99 saw a reversal of the long pre-1981 bear market 
in the major stock markets. The Dow Jones Index stood at 874 at the end of 1964 and at 875 in 1981, 
despite high inflation in the 1970s.  The next eighteen years’ bull market took share values to record 
highs, measured by cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratios.  As other financial markets boomed, 
people with financial and other assets prospered more than those relying on their labour income.   9
economy.
16  The point is that an innovating and increasingly unregulated financial 
sector contributed to increased prosperity in many countries. 
 
2. The Need for Regulation 
 
Financial sector regulation has evolved over the last two centuries as retail banks 
emerged as intermediaries converting large numbers of small deposits into lumpier 
loans.  This financial innovation enabled depositors to obtain security, convenience 
and perhaps interest on their liquid assets, while the deposits could be lent out for 
productive investment projects.  However, a small depositor has no practical way of 
assessing the creditworthiness of individual banks, and banking is inherently risky 
both due to the difficulty of assessing a loan requests and due to mismatch of 
maturities between assets and liabilities. In the nineteenth century this led to bank 
runs as people withdrew money from banks perceived to be at risk; herding and the 
maturity mismatch could make such perceptions self-fulfilling, so that even solvent 
banks failed due to lack of liquidity.  Policy solutions included vetting would-be bank 
owners, imposing restrictions on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, offering 
implicit or explicit guarantees to depositors, and creating lenders of last resort.   
Limiting bank ownership to men of good character became difficult as the impersonal 
market economy expanded.  Reserve requirements were inefficient, because requiring 
banks to hold government bills or cash reduced their ability to direct deposits into the 
best uses.  As part of the deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s in many countries, 
reserve requirements were reduced, along with restrictions on the types of business 
that financial institutions could conduct and discrimination against foreign financial 
firms.  Thus, deposit guarantees and lender of last resort in case of liquidity problems 
emerged as the core government functions. 
Guarantees to depositors are perceived as essential to maintain trust in the 
retail financial sector, but they can be expensive.  In the USA, bankruptcy of Savings 
                                                 
16 The overall change in global equality is disputed; the pattern was of increased equality across the 
world’s households and fewer people living in poverty (largely because of the performance of large 
Asian economies), but increased inequality across countries (because the numerous sub-Saharan 
economies performed relatively poorly).  Worst of all in the 1990s was the economic performance of 
the formerly centrally planed economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  Many of the 
transition economies and the subSaharan countries were outside the global financial system in the 
1990s and still had repressed domestic financial sectors, so their relatively poor performance was fairly 
independent of financial developments in the rest of the world.   10
and Loan institutions, which specialized in lending to homebuyers, led to the 
insolvency of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation at the end of 1986. 
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 initiated 
taxpayer involvement.  By 1995 over a thousand S&L institutions had failed, at a cost 
to taxpayers of $153 billion for reimbursing depositors (Curry and Shibut, 2000).  The 
S&L crisis was blamed on the institutions’ weaknesses and the cupidity of some 
owners, and after the bail-out the problem was declared solved.  However, the bail-out 
reinforced beliefs that deposits in the financial sector were safe, while scapegoating 
and punishment of a few high-profile owners did little to remove moral hazard. 
Without oversight by depositors, institutions had an incentive to accumulate 
high return (even if high risk) assets or, at a minimum, not to pay due diligence to 
their accumulation of risk.
17  Since the 1980s explicit deposit insurance exists in all 
OECD countries except Australia, and there it is implicit.  When the State Bank of 
South Australia collapsed in 1991, the state government rolled the bank over into a 
new BankSA, protecting depositors’ funds at an eventual cost of A$3.1 billion 
(McCarthy, 2002) – a huge amount for a state with just over a million residents.
18  As 
with the S&Ls a few people were stigmatized (the CEO and the state premier), while 
the taxpayer paid the tab. 
In sum, no government is prepared to stand by while small depositors lose 
money placed in commercial banks, even if there is no legal obligation to bail out 
depositors and even if the costs to the taxpayer are very large.  However, deposit 
insurance creates a moral hazard problem which regulatory authorities have to address.  
This is being done by replacing inefficient prudential policies such as reserve 
requirements by capital adequacy ratios aimed at ensuring that, in the case of poor 
lending, the owners of financial institutions stand to lose some of their own money as 
well as that of their depositors.  The slow process of drafting and implementing 
reforms, however, contrasted with the speed with which financial innovation was 
taking place in the 1990s and 2000s.
19  Rapid innovation with many new financial 
                                                 
17 The S&L crisis highlighted the asymmetric information and moral hazard problems.  Small local 
S&Ls should have been, of all financial institutions, those that depositors knew best, and community 
leaders owning S&Ls should have been relatively careful with their neighbours’ money.  However, 
depositors performed less due diligence knowing that their deposits were insured, and the owners 
worried less about taking risks with their neighbours’ money when deposits were insured. 
18 BankSA was privatized in 1995.  After a series of ownership changes, it became part of Westpac in 
2008. 
19 In the USA, in the 1980s and later, the lag between innovations and appropriate policy responses was 
exacerbated by lack of funding and ideological opposition to any regulation.  “A fragmented regulatory   11
instruments made it increasingly difficult for regulators to know exactly what a bank’s 
capital ratios were at any moment. 
 
3. The Credit-driven Boom 
 
The final ingredient in the argument developed in this paper is monetary policy.  Easy 
access to credit permitted potential risk-takers to become highly leveraged. This 
provided the backdrop to aggressive development of financial vehicles such as 
options and swaps (bond swaps, interest swaps, credit-default swaps), which provided 
for almost unlimited menus of degree of risk.  The opportunities to take advantage of 
such financial instruments were magnified by the low cost of money.   
A long credit-driven boom accompanied by financial innovation was good for 
economic growth, but had two major drawbacks.  First, in a period of rapid financial 
sector growth and innovation, lenders and regulators had less and less knowledge of 
institutions’ asset position and solvency.  Small depositors were, explicitly or 
implicitly, insured by governments, but financial institutions and large customers 
were unsure of the riskiness of their holdings, especially as financial instruments 
became more complex.
20   The complexity impeded appropriate policy responses, 
which lagged far behind the innovations.  The second problem was moral hazard, both 
on the part of lending institutions who took overly risky positions and of governments 
that were happy to take credit for prosperity but unwilling to burst bubbles. 
The first act in this era was the massive lending to low and middle-income 
countries by banks awash with petrodollars after 1973.  In principle, this was an 
efficient intermediation, and some borrowers (e.g. South Korea and Taiwan) used the 
availability of loans at low or negative real interest rates to good advantage.  In 
practice, inexperienced borrowers and lenders contracted loans that were poorly used.  
The catalyst for the 1982 Debt Crisis came when interest rates were increased in the 
US and UK in the early 1980s to address internal balance, but the fundamental 
                                                                                                                                            
regime suitable for a segmented financial-services industry became increasingly inadequate as the 
sharp lines between commercial banking, investment banking and other financial institutions were 
erased” (Eichengreen, 2008, 7).  
20  With ever more complex derivatives, even large investors made foolish decisions in the 1990s 
apparently based on ignorance of the risk.  Orange County, California, declared bankruptcy on 6 
December 1994 after losing $1.7 billion in an investment fund betting that interest rates would fall.   12
problem was that loans had not been used to generate revenue to service the debt.  
There was a hard landing for both over-indebted countries and over-exposed banks.
21 
The 1986-9 US Savings and Loan crisis signalled that, with inflation under 
control, credit was again readily available and financial institutions were not 
adequately assessing risk.  The recurrent financial crises of middle-income countries 
during the 1990s had specific national roots, but also reflected the globalization of 
financial markets and in several cases similar issues to those that would strike high-
income countries in 2007-8.  In Mexico before 1994 and in Thailand before 1997 the 
good times rolled.  In both cases economic growth was soundly based after successful 
economic reforms in the 1980s, and large amounts of capital flowed into the countries.  
However, some investments were overoptimistic and the scale of capital inflows was 
not sustainable.  In both Mexico and Thailand governments basked in the prosperity, 
for which they could take some credit, but when signs of trouble emerged (adverse 
political developments in Mexico and slower export growth in Thailand) governments 
were unwilling to accept that some of the boom had been cyclical and a slowdown 
was inevitable.  In both countries the strengthening of democracy added to this 
psychological barrier, as governments preferred not to be blamed for reducing the 
pace of prosperity in case they would be punished by the voters.
22 
 In Thailand rapid financial deregulation created a bubble.  The increasingly 
affluent middle class bought bigger cars, bigger houses and investment properties as 
their budget constraint expanded faster than most families could keep up with.   
Increased savings were deposited in financial institutions which lent to speculative 
building projects.  As long as the returns on loans were high, the financial institutions, 
assuming that the exchange rate was stable, could add to their profits by borrowing 
offshore at low interest rates.  Moral hazard arose because depositors assumed their 
funds were safe, while the deposit-taking institutions’ owners had overoptimistic 
expectations and assumed that they could walk away from bad loans (Krugman, 1998).  
                                                 
21 There is a similarity to the post-2007 crisis in that borrowers and lenders did not appreciate the risks, 
but resolution post-1982 was easier insofar as lenders and borrowers could negotiate a way out which 
would share the burden, whereas in 2008 the ultimate lenders and borrowers were so diffused that it 
was impossible to organize such an agreement. 
22 The Argentinean crisis of December 2001 had some similarities insofar as the central government 
delayed acting until it took the emergency step of freezing bank accounts.  Riots led to a political crisis, 
and a swift succession of presidents.  The crisis took a different form to the recoveries in Mexico and 
Thailand as the Argentinean government reneged on its debts, abandoned the peso-dollar-parity, and 
tried to inflate out of trouble.  The expansionary monetary policy softened the domestic recession in the 
short term, but at a cost to the country’s future growth prospects.   13
The government needed to take steps to reduce domestic demand, e.g. by raising 
interest rates in order to discourage capital outflow and new building projects, but that 
would have been deeply unpopular among people with floating-rate mortgages on 
their new apartment or people seeking loans for a new car, not to mention the negative 
macroeconomic impact on investment and employment.  The government vacillated.  
As foreign investors sough to move their money out, foreign exchange reserves were 
used to prop up the currency, until they ran out on 2
nd. July 1997.  Then the baht’s 
value fell by half against the US dollar, the price of imports soared and the economy 
entered a full-blown depression with negative output growth.  Contagion effects 
turned it into the Asian Crisis. 
The 1997-8 Asian Crisis illustrated the moral hazard problem and the costs of 
governments not responding when circumstances turned sour.  It also showed the 
resilience of soundly based economies.  Although there were contagion effects 
(stemming from increased competitiveness of exports from countries forced to 
devalue in the crisis, or from reassessment of risk across the region), Asian economies 
were not equally harmed.  Economies with sound financial systems such as Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Taiwan were relatively little affected.  The countries most 
affected were those whose financial institutions had the most non-performing loans 
(Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea), and even these economies quickly 
resumed economic growth.  The medium-term costs were political and are difficult to 
assess; the short-term chaos following the end of the Suharto regime in Indonesia 
appears to have led to an improved political situation, while the election of a populist 
prime minister in Thailand led to political conflicts which undermined the country’s 
democratic institutions and political stability. 
In the high-income countries, the debt-financed equity boom burst in 2000 
with the dot-com crunch, but consumers continued to happily run up debt and 
governments were happy that people were happy.  After the turn of the century the 
asset bubble shifted to housing markets, especially in the UK, USA, Australia, Spain 
and Ireland.
23  The phenomenon of negative aggregate saving in the USA, Australia 
and elsewhere caused only minor concerns, despite aging populations and inadequate 
public pension funds.  Governments, as in Mexico before 1994 or Thailand before 
                                                 
23 History matters.  Lenders were cautious about emerging market debt after the defaults of Russia in 
1998 and Argentina in 2001, and about loans to US non-financial corporations since the 2000 dot.com 
bubble.  The countries with the most flexible housing markets and financial sectors enjoyed economic 
booms as borrowers saw their asset values soar and increased their consumption.   14
July 1997, were eager to accept the praise for good times and did not want to spoil the 
party.  Governments fuelled leveraging by maintaining low interest rates and 
subsidized the bubbles by tax codes which gave tax breaks for mortgage payments 
and favoured corporate borrowing over financing through sale of shares.
24 
Corden (2008) argues that low interest rates were due to a world savings glut 
that became more pronounced after 2004-5 as oil-exporting countries ran high current 
account surpluses and China’s reserves increased to become the biggest of all by 
2007.
25  The savings glut should have resulted in lower world interest rates and lower 
activity, but to maintain internal balance (i.e. avoid increased unemployment) the Fed 
and other central banks adopted expansionary monetary policies which drove interest 
rates still lower.
26   While this analysis is true of 2004-7, that was only the latest 
episode in an era since the early 1970s during which global real interest rates have, 
apart from their early 1980s’ spike, been kept below their savings / (prudent) 
investment market equilibrium.  As deficit spending became discredited in the 1970s 
and macropolicy emphasis shifted from fiscal to monetary policy, central banks set 
monetary policy to maintain a balance between low inflation and full employment 
without paying adequate regard to the nature of investment that was underpinning 
aggregate demand. 
 
4. The 2007 Crisis 
 
The sub-prime crisis is conventionally dated from February 2007 when HSBC and 
New Century Financial declared greater than expected loan loss provisions.  New 
Century went bankrupt a few months later, while HSBC as a large diversified 
financial institution survived.  Subsequently many other financial institutions revealed 
their exposure to delinquent mortgage payments.  In July, with loss of confidence in 
securitized mortgages, the Federal Reserve injected liquidity into the system.
27  In 
                                                 
24 In countries where the mortgagee’s liability is limited to the value of the house, loans at or close to 
100% of a house’s value in a situation of expected capital gains offered a perceived one-way bet. 
25 Corden (2008) quotes IMF data that in 2007 21% of the sum of surpluses was accounted for by 
China, 20% by the major oil exporters, 13% by Japan and 11% by Germany. 
26 In IS-LM terms, the savings glut shifted the IS curve to the left, with lower equilibrium output and 
interest rates, while monetary policy shifted the LM curve to the right, offsetting the fall in output but 
augmenting the reduction in interest rates. 
27 The specifics of the sub-prime market, in which loans were approved by local banks, instruments to 
facilitate risk-spreading were constructed by money-centre institutions and the holders of the 
instruments were spread worldwide, exacerbated the complexity, non-transparency and moral hazard   15
August 2007 Countrywide Financial, the largest mortgage lender in the USA, 
encountered liquidity problems, and was eventually bought by Bank of America.   
However, in 2007 the magnitude of the US sub-prime crisis was not enough to drive a 
global crisis. 
The international nature of the problem was illustrated by a run on Northern 
Rock in the UK in September 2007, and the nationalization of the bank in February 
2008.  Northern Rock’s problems were primarily domestic.  In September 2008 the 
nationalized bank had 4,201 repossessions on its books, a tenth of the UK total; 
borrowers owed on average 105% of the supposed value of the house, and three-
quarters of the delinquent loans had been sold as sub-prime “Together” mortgages.  
When Bradford and Bingley, another major UK mortgage company, went bankrupt 
and was nationalized in September 2008, its problems stemmed from misjudging the 
buy-to-rent market in the UK.  Another mortgage lender, Alliance & Leicester, 
presumably with a less distressed asset portfolio was bought by Banco Santander in 
July 2008.  The asset price bubbles and subsequent financial sector problems in the 
USA and UK were not qualitatively different from many of the 1990s crises.
28 
An even clearer case of the international sub-prime crisis not being driven by 
US mortgages was Kazakhstan’s banking crisis.  This crisis was similar to Thailand’s 
insofar as in the mid-2000s Kazakh banks borrowed overseas at lower interest rates 
than they could charge borrowers in the booming property markets of Almaty and 
Astana.  Exchange risk was assumed to be minimal due to the government policy of 
targeting the dollar exchange rate, but the economy had been overheating since 2003 
as the central bank accumulated foreign exchange reserves, amounting to over twelve 
months of imports by the end of 2006.  Following a move away from de facto 
exchange rate targeting, the exchange rate against the US dollar began to appreciate in 
2006.  The construction boom started to moderate and non-performing loans began to 
increase, just as banks’ external debt payments were coming due.  According to the 
Financial Times, in October 2007 Kazakh banks' international borrowings totalled 
$40 billion, and conservative estimates put the banks’ foreign debt due in 2008 at 
                                                                                                                                            
elements seen in other crises (Corden, 2008, 7-8; Bathia, 2007).  When the holders of the instruments 
realized that they did not know the risk of their holdings, the ensuing panic led to a “run” among whose 
consequences was the collapse and government takeover of the insurer AIG in 2008. 
28 Laeven and Valencia (2008, 26) make the distinction that the rapid expansion of credit in the USA 
and UK up to 2007 followed financial innovation rather than deregulation, but the two are similar 
insofar as both innovation and deregulation take segments of the financial sector outside the ambit of 
existing regulatory mechanisms.    16
around $12 billion (Pomfret, 2008).  In November 2007 the government provided 
support of around $4 billion, targeted at construction projects in danger of being 
abandoned, and the central bank raised the official refinancing rate, which had been 
unchanged at 9% since July 2006, to 11%.  The accumulation of reserves during the 
2003-8 oil boom facilitated bailouts in 2008, but they represent a misuse of resources 
which will ultimately be underwritten by the taxpayer. 
National variations were not all driven by loans for construction or for 
mortgages.  France’s weakest financial institutions were mutuals, whose ownership 
structure created a bias towards excessive risk-taking.  The large numbers of owners 
of the mutuals could only claim back the initial value of their shares, so that the 
boards, which were elected from among the members and hence were likely to lack 
financial expertise, had control over large amounts of residual cash.  This system 
encouraged weak supervision of complex activities, as after 2004 mutual after mutual 
was tempted to use its funds in high return, but high risk, markets and nobody reined 
in the traders until the mutual took a big loss.  In 2005 Crédit Mutuel lost 320 million 
euros on equity derivatives, in 2007 Calyon, the investment banking arm of Crédit 
Agricole lost 250 million euros on credit default swaps, and in 2008 Caisse d’Epargne 
lost 600 million euros on equity derivatives.
29  The details were often covered up, but, 
typical of many big trading-loss episodes of the 1990s and 2000s (Table 2), Calyon 
blamed a rogue trader: “this is an isolated incident and the work of an individual 
trader who did not respect our risk procedures and who breached our trading limits” 
stated Calyon spokeswoman Anne Robert.  Calyon sacked Richard Bierbaum, who 
vigorously denied unauthorized trading, claiming that his positions were reported to 
management every day.  Whatever the specifics of Bierbaum’s relation with Crédit 
Agricole’s Calyon, the pattern was too common to blame on the individual trader’s 
shortcomings.
30 
Some company failures reflected changes in the structure of financial markets.  
When perceptions of credit risk made a quantum shift in the USA in the summer of 
                                                 
29 Also in 2008 Natixis, an investment bank jointly owned by Caisse d’Epargne and Banque Populaire, 
was forced into a 3.7 billion euros right issue in September 2008 to cover heavy losses. 
30 The case was reported on Bloomberg by Pierre Paulden, Jacqueline Simmons and Hamish Risk – 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=aNS9FsnCwYco  
Some outsiders were surprised that an old and previously conservative French bank would entrust 
investment of such large funds to a 26-year-old American with a history of aggressive and anti-social 
behaviour, but successful traders tended to be young and aggressive - and successful as long as their 
luck held out.   17
2008, the investment banks which relied on wholesale funding were much more 
exposed than retail banks with their more stable federally insured deposits.  Within a 
few months the five major investment banks had either changed their status to 
wholesale banks (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley), been taken over by banks 
(Bear Sterns by JPMorganChase and Merrill Lynch by Bank of America) or gone 
bankrupt (Lehman Brothers).
31  As with the collapse of any large businesses these 
events led to job losses, especially in financial centres such as New York City and 
London, but the simultaneous disappearance of these specialized institutions suggests 
that the business model had become obsolete and it was time for pure investment 
banks to disappear.
32 
Observers blamed the crises on a principal-agent problem which arose because 
employees of financial institutions had an incentive to focus on short-term results 
which drove their annual bonuses rather than on increasing long-term value.  This was, 
however, nothing new in 2007.  Owners were happy to accept risky behaviour as long 
as short-term returns were high.  Senior managers gave free rein to risk-takers who 
made profits, but entered into denial when the “rogue traders” made losses.   
Spectacular losses by traders such as Nick Leeson, who lost over a billion dollars for 
Barings in 1995, Yasuo Hamanaka, who lost $2.6 billion for Sumitomo in copper 
futures markets in 1996, and Jérôme Kerviel, who generated 1.4 billion euros profit 
for Société Générale in 2007 and then lost 4.9 billion in three days in January 2008 
were routinely ascribed to “rogue traders”, but they were not isolated occurrences 
(Table 2), and undoubtedly many such losses went unreported in the press.  “Rogue 
traders” were sometimes illegally individualist, but often they were valued by senior 
management, who turned a blind eye when risk-taking traders cut corners as long as 
the results were good, but spoke of unauthorized activities if things turned sour. 
                                                 
31  In Lehman’s case the performing assets were bought by other banks (primarily Barclays and 
Nomura).  Citi, which had expanded its activities when CitiGroup was established in the 1990s to allow 
Citibank to move into investment banking, also ran into trouble, requiring a large government bail-out.  
In January 2009 the integrated model was abandoned as Citi split into two parts. 
32 The 1933 Glass-Steagall Act banned commercial banks from underwriting securities and investment 
banks profited from the market segmentation, but as restrictions on commercial banks’ activities were 
loosened the investment banks came under pressure.  The ‘Four Horsemen’, the biggest investment 
banks outside New York, disappeared in the late 1990s: in 1997 Nations Bank (now part of Bank of 
America) bought Montgomery Securities and Bankers Trust bought Alex, Brown (now part of 
Deutsche Bank), Bank of America bought Robertson Stephens in 1998, and Chase Manhattan bought 
Hambrecht & Quist in 1999.  Other takeovers by commercial banks include Dresdner Bank’s 1995 
purchase of the UK investment bank Kleinwort Benson and 2000 purchase of US investment bank 
Wasserstein, Perella, and Credit Suisse’s 2000 takeover of Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette.   18
 In sum, many of the financial crises since the 1970s have common features, 
primarily high leveraging and excessive risk-taking.  The crisis that began to unfold in 
2007 was the most serious because it affected large institutions in the world’s largest 
economy, as well as having independent roots in other economies.  Failures of large 
multinational financial institutions are more important for the global economy than 
the failure of British mortgage companies or Kazakh banks, but in all of these cases 
there was a common cause rather than a contagion effect, and failure was selective.  A 
further common feature was that the unfolding of the crises was associated with 
governments promising large amounts of taxpayers’ money to fix the problems. 
  The US Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) announced in 
October 2008 offered $700 billion to purchase or insure troubled assets, so that banks 
could reduce their leveraging without shrinking their loans.
33  The Federal Reserve 
also took on many of these loans, especially mortgages after Fanny Mae, Freddie Mac 
and Washington Mutual (the largest remaining S&L) were taken over by the US 
Treasury in September 2008, to the extent that the Fed’s balance sheet grew from 
$900 billion in August to $2,200 billion in November 2008, ultimately financed by 
newly created reserves.  The collapse of asset-backed securities markets prevented 
banks from securitizing and selling on credit card debt and other small loans in order 
to obtain resources to make new loans, and again the Treasury moved in, using TARP 
money, primarily to maintain the flow of consumer credit, again ultimately based on 
the Fed’s ability to created unlimited amounts of money.  In sum, the US 
government’s measures aimed to help banks to adjust to a new environment where 
increased perceptions of credit risk call for less leveraged balance sheets, but they did 
so by leveraging TARP and other funding with the Fed’s unlimited credit line.   
Moreover, the scope of Treasury assistance went beyond normal definitions of banks 
as the US Government spent $85 billion in September 2008 to bail out AIG, an 
insurance company which had provided insurance cover for many banks’ more 
complex assets; AIG obviously had little idea of just how risky these were. 
An alternative approach to banking crises is the ‘bad bank’ approach, where 
the poorest performing assets are transferred from a troubled bank’s balance sheet into 
a new ‘bad bank’ (or Asset Management Company, AMC), so that the remaining 
                                                 
33 The extent of the change in leverage of the investment banks was dramatic.  Morgan Stanley reported 
in October 2008 that they had $16 of assets for each dollar of capital, compared to $33 a year earlier 
(reported in The Economist (London) , 29 November 2008, Briefing section).  Capital requirements 
even of diversified banks began to look inadequate as they downgraded the value of their assets.    19
‘good bank’ is viable.
34   This may minimize the cost of a bail-out,
35 but it highlights 
the source of the problem insofar as the ‘bad bank’ is the repository of high-risk loans 
that should not have been made by a prudent bank.  The idea is to allow restructurers 
to specialize in maximizing the value of the bad banks’ assets, while bank managers 
focus on making the good bank work.  However, if the bad loans are not sold off 
quickly and bad banks live on, this option can become costly, as in the Finnish 
banking crisis of the early 1990s, when it took a decade to wind down all of the bad 
banks which became known in Finnish as garbage banks (roskapankki).  The model 
was also used by the Swiss authorities in 2006 to take $60 billion of bad loans off the 
UBS balance sheet into a bad bank run by the central bank 
Whatever the details of individual countries’ crises in 2007-8, they shared the 
common feature of most financial crises since the 1970s.  Financial institutions 
aggressively sought high returns, even though the level of risk would lead to defaults 
and a crisis.  Depositors and other creditors played along because they did not have to 
bear the full extent of the risk.  Financial deregulation and innovation made this 
possible, and easy credit facilitated the process.  Governments which could have 
opted for more regulation or tighter monetary polices were unwilling to spoil the party.  
There were idiosyncratic features that exacerbated crises and there were principal-
agent problems, but these can be exaggerated.  In the end excessive risk-taking led to 
failures and large calls on public revenues, and heeding these calls reinforced the 
moral hazard aspects of the system by reassuring key players that the government 
would cover a share of the losses. 
. 
5. Is Capitalism Failing? 
 
Financial crises have become more frequent since the 1970s.  Easy credit reinforced 
the propensity for moral hazard which is inherent in financial systems with deposit 
                                                 
34 A review of seven AMCs by Klingebiel (2000) reveals a mixed record.  In two of three cases, AMCs 
for corporate restructuring failed to achieve their goal of expediting bank or corporate restructuring.  
AMCs used to dispose of assets rapidly fared somewhat better.  Objectives of resolving insolvent and 
unviable financial institutions were achieved in Spain and the USA; selling off AMCs’ assets required 
an easily liquefiable asset (e.g. real estate), appropriate funding, professional management, skilled 
resources, good information and management systems, adequate bankruptcy and foreclosure laws, 
political independence, and transparent operations. In Mexico and the Philippines governments 
transferred to AMCs politically motivated loans or fraudulent assets, which were difficult for a 
government agency susceptible to political pressure and lacking independence to resolve or sell off. 
35 The good bank/bad bank model adopted in Sweden’s banking crisis in the early 1990s is credited 
with keeping the cost of bail-out below two percent of GDP.   20
insurance, and financial sector deregulation and innovation facilitated risk-taking.   
Policymakers used the interest rate as an instrument to maintain internal balance 
between inflation and unemployment, ignoring its role as the price of capital and 
standing by as asset bubbles emerged.  The behaviour of the financial sector in the 
1990s and 2000s was characterized by excessive risk-taking, and by blaming 
scapegoats when the risk-taking backfired, rather than seeing it as systemic.   
For the post-2007 crisis, the crises of the 1990s offer more relevant lessons 
than the depression of the 1930s.  The Mexican and Thai governments should have 
acted sooner to limit the expansion of demand, just as governments in the USA, UK 
and elsewhere should have restrained the pre-2007 asset bubbles.  Instead the US and 
UK authorities held on to the same wishful thinking that the good times were firmly 
based and did not need remedial action, despite the warnings from the S&L, Long-
Term Credit Management and dot.com crises.  The political problem is that 
governments are unwilling to say that belts have to be tightened because voters do not 
want to hear this until a crisis erupts, and then they want a quick fix. 
In 2008 the overwhelming view in the USA and western Europe was that 
governments needed to do something, but there was confusion over whether the 
“something” was necessary (a) to prop up financial institutions (or major non-
financial corporations) whose failure would have economy-wide negative effects, (b) 
as a Keynesian stimulus to aggregate demand or (c) to regulate financial sectors in 
order to prevent further crises.  The first two in particular were blurred as many 
economists advocated fiscal stimuli through, say, spending on infrastructure or 
education (especially if they were teachers), while policymakers more often 
responded to demands to bail-out individual firms (especially if they were in 
politically sensitive locations).  In the USA in 2008 the latter approach led to 
inconsistent polices in terms of who should lose: at AIG only common shareholders 
suffered, at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both common and preferred shareholders 
lost, and at Washington Mutual all shareholders and senior debt holders lost).  This is 
unfair, and also wrong.  Rethinking financial regulation may (or may not) be a 
justified long-term response and a Keynesian fiscal stimulus may be an appropriate 
short-term response, but selective bail-outs of banks and other firms in trouble reward 
those who took unjustified risks or keep in business firms that need to die.   21
For all of the talk of “meltdown” – a cataclysmic but never defined term
36 – 
closure of banks is not a disaster.  Lessons from events of the 1990s, such as the 
Asian Crisis, are relevant.  Financial institutions that did not manage risk well were 
the ones that failed.  Better-managed (or luckier) banks do not have toxic asset 
portfolios.  In any other industry this would be seen as a violent shake-up, unpleasant 
for those working in the firms that close down, but with winners as well as losers in 
the industry, and all part of the reorganizations that make for a dynamic market 
economy.  When Lehman Brothers shut down, other institutions bought the good 
assets at discounted prices, Lehman shareholders paid for their bank having assumed 
excessive bad debts, and shareholders in those banks which bought wisely in the 
firesale should reap returns.  Increased interest rates on inter-bank loans reduce the 
intermediation taking place, but are an appropriate signal of the scarcity of credit and 
of doubt about the quality of loan portfolios.  The real economy will contract – as 
happened in Mexico in 1994-6 and in Thailand in 1997-9 – but it will emerge stronger 
as poor banks disappear and good banks are reminded of the need for careful risk 
management.
37 
Bank bail outs are not just a dubious use of taxpayers’ money to support 
inefficient firms.  Moral hazard matters.  Financial institutions cannot be shown that 
big profits and bonuses in a boom do not have to be balanced by loss of income when 
they get things wrong.  The business of financial intermediation is to assess loan 
quality and when financial institutions fail to do that correctly (and complexity is no 
excuse for taking on bad debts), their owners and professional staff should pay for it.
38  
Nationalization of loss-making banks (the Gordon Brown Plan) is a desperate 
measure, which is likely only to soften the blow to bank owners and managers.  State-
owned banks have a poor record worldwide; too often they become wards of the state, 
requiring taxpayer support. 
                                                 
36 Commenting on financial crises since 1987, Michael Lewis, author of Liar’s Poker, asked “How 
many times does the end of the world as we know it need to arrive before we realize that it is not the 
end of the world as we know it?” (quoted in The Economist (London) 29 November 2008, Books and 
Arts section). 
37 Recession post-2008 will also be due to increased savings as households in the countries which 
experienced the biggest housing booms deleverage, but correction of low and negative savings rates in 
countries with aging population is desirable 
38 Caveat emptor also applies.  Bernie Madoff appears to have broken many laws (keeping two sets of 
books suggest that he was aware of this), but people trusted him unreasonably and agencies failed to 
enforce the laws.  Ronald Cass (2008) argues that this is because Madoff was an insider, who preyed 
particularly on Jews and others with a shared affinity and who was not pursued by enforcers such as the 
SEC because he was a well-known member of the financial establishment.   22
What then is the role for the state?  Deposit insurance is essential to maintain 
the trust of small depositors in deposit-taking institutions and to avoid old-fashioned 
(or not so old-fashioned in the case of Northern Rock) bank runs.  Inevitably deposit 
insurance introduces an element of moral hazard, and the counterpart has to be 
prudential regulation to ensure that financial institutions do not take excessive risks 
with depositors money, secure in the knowledge that if things go sour they can walk 
away.  In a world of complex financial instruments and fast-changing asset portfolios, 
detailed external oversight of the loan portfolio even by the best-trained regulators is 
increasingly difficult.  Capital adequacy ratios are a way of ensuring that banks’ 
owners have something to lose, but this still requires detailed oversight to ensure that 
the capital is not withdrawn on the basis of insider information about an imminent 
collapse.  Caps on golden parachutes or other claims by managers who use depositors’ 
money poorly are also appropriate; if a bank goes under, the senior management 
should be liable and bear a cost (or, at least, not receive a reward).  As it stands, with 
depositor insurance and institutions on the verge of collapse ensuring that any liquid 
assets are used to recompense owners and employees, creditors and the taxpayer bear 
most of the cost of a financial institution’s failure. 
Taxpayers should be concerned about being the fall guys in cases of financial 
failure.  Rather than seeking a white knight promising a return to the high-growth 
consumption of the past decades, voters must recognize that governments have fuelled 
an unsustainable credit-driven boom through a cheap money policy, and that the 
excesses of that boom are past.  This does not mean a long-term fall in average living 
standards, but rather an end to artificially high growth based on unsustainable credit 
(e.g. credit card debt, second mortgages and so forth).  Banks need to be made to bear 
the cost if they take on poor credit risks, so that they will be tougher in assessing loan 
applications.  Governments should support interest rates based on conditions in the 
credit market, and not push for artificially low interest rates with the aim of avoiding 
bankruptcies or reducing short-term unemployment.  Voters need to accept these 
restraints, and not punish current governments for reversing the monetary ease of 
recent past decades.  So much the better that increased interest rates will offer better 
terms to savers: falling savings rates in countries with aging populations were the dark 
side of the boom in the USA, UK, Australia and elsewhere. 
The messages of this paper are positive.  The economies of the major capitalist 
nations are more resilient than in the past, and the post-2007 crisis will not approach   23
that of the 1930s in its impact on the real economy.  However, the psychological 
message may be hard for policymakers and consumers to accept: a credit-fuelled 
boom has to end, and the crisis is not to be averted by cheap money.  Just as the 
prosperity with security of the 1950s and 1960s ultimately had to be corrected by 
admitting that fiscal policy biased towards budget deficits was not a long term option, 
governments in the 2000s must accept that growth based on easy credit is not a long-
term option.  The moral hazard behind the crises of recent decades was facilitated by 
cheap money that encouraged excessive leveraging all across the economy, and with 
global financial markets this could result in a crisis in any part of the world.  The 
severity of these crises can be reduced through better financial market regulation to 
reduce moral hazard and better macroeconomic policies to underpin a sustainable 
price of credit.  This is part of capitalism’s evolution, not the end of capitalism. 
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Table 2: Rogue Traders’ Losses, Fraudulent and Non-fraudulent. 
 







Jérôme Kerviel  Société Générale  2008  EUR 
4.9 bn 
$6.5 bn   European 
Index 
Futures 




$4.6 bn   Gas Futures 
John 
Meriwether 













$2.6 bn   Copper 
Futures  
Robert Citron  Orange County  1994 USD 
1.7 bn 




Aracruz, Brazil  2008 BRL 
4.62 bn 




BAWAG, Austria,  2000 EUR 
1.4 bn 









$1.38 bn   Oil Futures  
Leslie Chang   CITIC Pacific  2008 HKD 
14.7 bn 
$1.9 bn   Foreign 
Exchange 
Trading 
Nick Leeson  Barings Bank  1995 GBP 
0.827 bn 




Daiwa Bank  1995 JPY 
103.4 bn 







$0.975 bn   Derivatives 
Friedhelm 
Breuers 
WestLB, Germany 2007 EUR 
0.60 bn 
$0.82 bn   Shares  
John Rusnak  Allied Irish Banks  2002 USD 
0.691 bn 
$0.69 bn   Foreign 
Exchange 
Options  
Peter Young  Morgan Grenfell, 
UK 
1997 GBP 
0.4 bn  
$0.7 bn   Shares   





$0.6 bn   Mortgage-
Backed 
Securities  









Sadia, Brazil  2008 BRL 
0.76 bn









$0.5bn   Equity 
Derivatives   27





$0.4 bn   Short IT 
stocks  




$0.4 bn   Foreign 
Exchange 
Trading 




$0.4 bn   Corporate 
Bonds 




$0.36 bn   Foreign 
Exchange 
Trading  




$0.35 bn   Government 
Bonds   
Richard "Chip" 
Bierbaum 
Calyon 2007 EUR 
0.25 bn 
$0.35 bn   Credit-
default 
swaps  









































NatWest, UK  1997 GBP 
0.09 bn 
$0.2 bn   Interest Rate 
Options  
Evan Dooley  MF Global, USA  2008 USD 
0.14 bn 
$0.14 bn   Wheat 
Futures   














$0.1 bn   Equity 
Derivatives  








Notes: trading losses of USD100 million or higher since the early 1970s 
* at time of loss   
Source:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_trading_losses  -- an incomplete list 
based on press references. 
 
 